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ABSTRACT
Nine commercial airline pilots served as test subjects in a study
to compare acceleration control with pulse control in simulated
spacecraft docking maneuvers. Simulated remote dockings of
an orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV) to a space station were
initiated from 50, 100, and 150 meters along the station's -V-
bar (minus velocity vector). All unsuccessful missions were
reflown. Five-way mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA)
with one between factor, first mode, and four within factors,
mode, block, range, and trial were performed on the data.
Recorded performance measures included mission duration,
and fuel consumption along each of the three coordinate axes.
Mission duration was lower with pulse mode while delta V
(fuel consumption) was lower with acceleration mode.
Subjects used more fuel to travel faster with pulse mode than
with acceleration mode. Mission duration, delta V, X delta V,
Y delta V, and Z delta V all increased with range. Subjects
commanded the OMV to "fly" at faster rates from further
distances. These higher average velocities were paid for with
increased fuel consumption. Asymmetrical transfer was found
in that the mode transitions could not be predicted solely from
the mission duration main effect. More testing is advised to
understand the manual control aspects of spaceflight
maneuvers better.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, in the design of large and complex systems such
as aircraft, automobiles, and nuclear power plants, designers
typically ignored human factors considerations or left them
until too late in the design process to be useful. Controls and
displays located outside reach and sight envelopes,
inappropriate automation, and operating procedures designed
without concern for man-in-the-loop considerations have
plagued various industries and led to the loss of many lives,
vehicles, and other equipment. These accidents are highly
visible in the aviation industry where two-thirds of the
commercial aviation incidents and almost 90% of the general
caused or influenced by human error. 1
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of
Defense (DOD), and the major airline manufacturers are
actively involved with investigating the human factors
environment of aircraft to identify the means to reduce the
likelihood of human error. "At first sight, it is a strange
professional link between the aerospace design engineer and
the psychologist. Yet, since the days of the Wright brothers,
there has always been a need for designers to take human
factors into consideration to ensure the efficiency of any flying
machine." 2 Two particular concerns are automation and crew
coordination and their relationships with flight procedures.
While spaceflight does not put millions of civilians at risk
every day, every minor incident receives tremendous attention
by the media and the public. On-orbit flight activities put
lives, missions, and billions of dollars of hardware in
jeopardy. Current and future research into the manual control
aspects of orbital flight will have tremendous payoffs in
safety, reliability, efficiency, and productivity as space traffic
increases in the upcoming Space Station Freedom era.
Spacecraft docking will be a commonplace activity in the era of
the space station. Shuttle orbiters, orbital maneuvering
vehicles (OMV) (or equivalent), and orbital transfer vehicles
(OTV) will be docking to the station. Vehicles will dock with
satellites as well to return them to the station. Further into the
future, vehicles will be docking in orbit around Mars, in lunar
orbit, and on return to Earth orbit. Space Station Freedom will
be used as a staging area for assembling and verifying
spacecraft en route to the moon and Mars. It will also be used
as a repair shop for satellites and a platform for experiments
and equipment. These activities will increase the docking
traffic at the station further justifying current research agendas.
Current state-of-the-art computer graphics has improved real-
time simulation and intensive and comprehensive human
factors investigations with which researchers can study and
better understand these activities.
Very little research describing human factors implications of
spacecraft docking operations has been documented in the
twenty-five years since the first spacecraft docking. 3-20
Parameters of flight such as approach and impact velocities,
braking gates, and control modes must be examined to
uncover fundamental human factors capabilities and
shortcomings with regard to piloting spacecraft. Results from
these studies will assist in expanding the operational flight
envelope, and increasing safety and productivity. This study
represents another in a series of experiments designed to
accumulate a comprehensive database describing the manual
control aspects of orbital flight.
This paper is a modification of American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics paper 91-0787 presented at the
Aerospace Sciences Meeting, Reno, NV, January 199l.
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Practical exploration by man of the nearest regions of
space has already developed its own history which
consists of separately distinguishable stages. During
the first stage, mankind's curiosity concentrated mainly
on the technical possibilities of overcomin_z Earth's
gravity. During the next stage, the main focus of study
centered on the survival of living organisms, including
humans, in space using technical devices. The present
stage primarily involves mankind's active work during
prolonged spaceflights. Hence, in the short history of
astronautics and cosmonautics, the centre of interest
has been shifting away from the engineering sciences
towards the biological, medical, and psychological
sciences. 21 (p. 352)
Along with the psychological studies related to stress and
workload are studies concerned with manual control and other
areas in the general category of human factors. On Space
Station Freedom, crewmembers will be remotely operating
vehicles, robots, and experiments subject to the peculiarities of
zero-g, orbital mechanics, temperature extremes, and hard
vacuum. Current research geared toward uncovering and
exploring performance aspects of this environment could have
large payoffs in the future.
The importance of manual control aspects of spaceflight
operations, such as rendezvous and docking, was recognized
early in the United States space program. After only three
manned flights in the Mercury Program, the Technical
Director, Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, Aerospace Medical
Research Laboratories, Wright-Patterson AFB concluded "that
men can contribute greatly to the successful accomplishment of
many types of space missions .... the Mercury astronauts
were able to manually compensate [sic] for equipment
malfunctions and thereby complete missions which otherwise
would have failed or terminated prematurely." 22 (p. 79) As
Gemini XII and Apollo XI astronaut Buzz Aldrin explains,
"Manned orbital rendezvous was a vital field, because any way
you cut it, if we were going to assemble large interplanetary
spacecraft, we'd have to master the techniques of space
rendezvous--bringing two or more separately launched
spacecraft together in orbit. With computers we could reduce
the blizzard of spherical geometry and calculus equations
down to automated rendezvous procedures. But I'd seen
enough autopilots malfunction during my flying career to
realize that the spacecraft NASA planned to use for Earth
orbital lunar spaceflight would need some kind of manual
backup." 23
The Soviets also value the flexibility that manual control
allows in "the capabilities of man to see three dimensions and
to evaluate the situation better than a machine for flight
conditions that have not been provided for by the program."
15 (p. 804) Gemini X and Apollo XI astronaut Michael
Collins advocates manual control as follows, "was this not a
noble cause, to build an autonomous capability, to allow a
manned spacecraft to roam free of ground control, to compute
its own maneuvers? Was not the very name of the game, in
manned space flight, to put the pilots in control?" 24 (p. 169)
Further justification for manual control may be found in the
airline industry where "pilots still manually fly even the most
highly automated aircraft, if only to maintain their flying skills
in the case that they are called on if the automatics fail." 1 (pp.
293-4)
While automation is and will continue to be an important
aspect of manned space flight,
It is unlikely that the pilot will be eliminated, any more
than will the operator of a nuclear power plant. Our
society believes that humans should have ultimate
responsibility for control of complex systems even if
inserting the human degrades overall system
performance most of the time. The human is still the
ultimate back-up system. While machines that are
overloaded fail abruptly, people degrade gracefully
under excessive levels of workload. Thus it seems
prudent to include human operators, even if only as the
sub-system of last resort that can "pull the plug."
Furthermore, there are also strong political forces to
keep humans employed. 25 (p. 183)
The development
of rendezvous and docking procedures arose in the
evolution of the U.S. space program once the initial
exploratory phase (Mercury) had been successfully
completed and missions became more ambitious. In
the United States, the Gemini program was used to
acquire these techniques and develop these
technologies, and to give astronauts the practice they
needed to get to the moon. Orbital rendezvous
procedures were performed as the various Gemini craft
tracked and approached their respective rendezvous
targets. Gemini demonstrated that "precise flight-crew
responses during orbital flight is [._d critically
dependent upon the fidelity of the simulation training
received prior to flight" 25 (p. 1) 3 (p. 11).
While simulators were, and are, used extensively for
procedure development and training, evidence of their use in
human factors studies is virtually non-existent in the literature.
Presumably, with the rush to get men to the moon and back
before the end of the decade, time, money, and effort spent on
such studies was not justifiable. With only 12 operational
dockings in the Apollo program, three in Skylab, and one for
the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), productivity benefits
would not have been realized with the low economies of scale
of 16 dockings over 10 years. By the end of the 1990s, space
shuttle orbiters will be bringing crew and equipment to Space
Station Freedom. By 2010, components of lunar bases and
spacecraft will be brought to the station for checkout and
assembly. Sorties will be made to investigate and repair
satellites and other payloads. A small investment now geared
toward a better understanding of manual control aspects of
piloting docking maneuvers and other space operations could
yield large payoffs in the future in terms of safety, reliability,
productivity, and launch costs.
Another justification for the current interest in manual control
aspects of spacecraft docking operations concerns the
differences in on-board sensors and instrumentation between
previous Apollo missions and future spacecraft dockings to the
station. As Buzz Aldrin recalls the docking after ascent from
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the lunar surface, "Our radar and the computers on the two
spacecraft searched for each other and then locked on and
communicated in a soundless digital exchange." 23 Current
plans for Space Station Freedom omit this communication
capability as well as a laser rangefinder that was proposed
earlier. The rendezvous radar on the space shuttle is limited by
a minimum operational range of 80 feet. 27 Ironically,
rendezvous and docking operations will be harder to perform
twenty years from now than they were twenty years ago
because of reduced instrumentation and a paucity of
information presented to the pilots.
In addition to discovering approach velocities, braking gates,
control modes and other flight procedures that will increase
safety, efficiency, and productivity, and decrease fuel use,
research into the manual control aspects of space operations
such as docking maneuvers has hardware implications. For
example, there is a tradeoff between the mass of a space
station or satellite docking fixture and the amount (mass) of
fuel that will be consumed by a vehicle docking with it.
(Although current planning has vehicles berthing with the
station via a manipulator arm, rather than docking, this
tradeoff may be appropriate for satellite dockings.) Increased
strength is paid for with an increase in docking fixture mass.
More fuel is needed to control impact velocity when docking
with a delicate structure than with a more massive, stronger
one. Since launch costs are directly proportional to launch
mass, hardware designers are incessantly endeavoring to
reduce mass. However, over an operational lifetime,
operational costs may be elevated as a result of the increased
fuel consumption necessary to dock with a lighter, more
fragile target. Human factors studies can produce data
concerning the fuel mass/approach velocity tradeoff. Flight
simulator experiments can be conducted to analyze
quantitatively the effect that impact velocity has on fuel
consumption. In this way, the lifetime operational costs can
be better understood and long-term benefits will not be
sacrificed for short-term gains.
From the Gemini program, there is a historic example of
uncertainties in fuel consumption requirements. Ratios of
actual fuel consumption to theoretically minimum fuel
consumption values varied from 1.52 to 4.28 for the ten
rendezvous operations. 24 Clearly, mission planners need to
have a better idea of this ratio in order to allocate supplies for
any given mission correctly. Research into the manual control
aspects of rendezvous maneuvers will help reduce both the
absolute value and the variance of the actual/theoretical fuel
consumption ratio.
Additionally, a comprehensive study of the impact velocity
effect on fuel consumption will also yield the effect on mission
duration. In the future, the desire to dock during orbital
daylight, an increase in space traffic, and other constraints will
make time management almost as important as fuel
management. In January 1990, the Long Duration Exposure
Facility (LDEF) was within weeks of tumbling out of control
and deorbiting when the space shuttle crew rescued it. This is
one example where time may be very important and a full
understanding of the performance envelope for piloting may be
necessary for the success of the mission. Studies can be
performed to assess the impact of docking port location,
number, and design on time and fuel consumption. In short, a
comprehensive and extensive study of manual control aspects
of spaceflight can produce many long-term savings of time,
fuel, and launch costs while increasing safety and reliability.
This is currently a timely research agenda to which greater
resources and attention are owed.
BACKGROUND
The first spacecraft docking occurred in March 1966 during
the Gemini 8 flight of Dave Scott and Neil Armstrong.
Armstrong piloted the docking to the Agena target vehicle. "It
was also 100 percent manually flown, not unlike mid-air
refueling of airplanes, and it made us pilots feel good to hear
Neil report that it had been easy, with no surprises." 24 (p.
180) One half hour after docking, however, a malfunction in
the Gemini attitude control system led to uncontrolled
tumbling. Armstrong was able to null the motion until he
released the hand controller at which point the tumbling
restarted. To simplify the problem, he backed the Gemini
away from the Agena. This unfortunately aggravated the
situation and the rotation rate increased to 300 degrees per
second. He was ultimately able to recover control and stop the
tumbling solely through manual control of the reentry attitude
system. "The whole thing had lasted perhaps ten minutes, but
they were the hairiest ten minutes in the space program so far."
24 (p. 182).
"Neil was far and away the most experienced test pilot among
the astronauts." 24 (p. 317) His "Right Stuff' piloting skill
was also required during the Apollo XI landing when he
discovered that the designated landing location was too rough
to achieve a safe landing. He then resorted to manual piloting
to traverse the craters to a smoother spot. As Armstrong's
crewmate Buzz Aldrin recalls,
At 500 feet, Neil was not satisfied with the landing
zone. He took over manual control from the computer,
slowing our descent from 20 feet per second to only
nine, and then at 300 feet, to a descent of only three
and a half feet a0er second .... Neil did not like what
he saw below. 23
Ultimately, of course, the landing was successful illustrating
the flexibility of manual back-up without which, the mission
most likely would have failed. As Gordo Cooper said after his
Faith 7 debriefing, "'... man is a pretty good backup system.
,,, 23. Along with John Glenn's piloting skill in flying the
. ,
reentry of his Friendship 7 mission when it was thought his
heat shield became dislodged, this incident helped to entrench
the importance of manual control in the NASA mindset.
Even in the commercial airline industry, where there is far
more collective piloting experience than in space, there is an
apprehension of automation. Pilots have been known to make
comments such as, "In some cases the forces driving
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technology have caused the design of automated systems
which compromise the ability of the pilot to fulfill his
responsibilities for the safety of the airplane under his
command." 28 (p. 155) Since all NASA pilots come from a
jet pilot heritage, comments such as these are relevant for the
space program as well.
On Gemini X, in July 1966, John Young "finds [docking] as
easy as Neil did on Gemini 8." 24 (p. 211). Dockings were
also performed on Geminis XI, and XII in September and
November respectively. Apollos 9 and 10 practiced orbital
docking operations with the Apollo configuration in 1969.
(See 3 for a detailed description of Apollo rendezvous and
docking procedures.)
Despite the flexibility and resourcefulness that crewmembers
provide, it must be admitted that they also supply additional
means for malfunction and error.
CURRENT STUDY
Docking maneuvers have traditionally been simulated and
ultimately performed in a "pulse" control mode. That is,
thrusts of a prescribed magnitude (duration) were commanded
by deflection of a hand controller regardless of deflection angle
or duration. Subsequent burns were only possible after
release of the joystick to its rest position. NASA space shuttle
pilots and orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV) pilots currently
are instructed to use pulse control presumably for fuel con-
sumption and safety reasons. 27, 29
Nevertheless, all previous experimentation by the authors
involved acceleration control in which thruster commands
were sent for the duration of the deflection. 38 This study
involved a formal comparison between pulse control and
acceleration control to determine which is better for fuel
consumption, mission duration, safety, and other
considerations.
In the current study, the trials were organized in an APPA and
PAAP orders where A denotes a series of 18 simulated
dockings using acceleration control and P corresponds to a
series with pulse mode. Subjects who began with acceleration
mode, continued with two blocks of pulse mode before
returning to their final block with pulse mode (i.e., APPA).
Subjects beginning with pulse mode did the opposite (i.e.,
PAAP).
One of the intents of this format was to unearth any
asymmetrical transfer that may be present. Asymmetrical
transfer would be evident if a control mode x order (mode x
first mode) effect were found. 30 It specifically means the
effect of practice with one control mode on subsequent
performance with the other control mode is different for the
two possible sequences of activity (i.e., a PA sequence vs. an
AP sequence). This could occur, for example, if subjects who
began with pulse mode achieved lower mission duration
values when they later flew in acceleration mode than those
who began with acceleration mode and followed with pulse
mode. Such a finding would be useful for identifying which
control mode to use for training as opposed to flight.
Additionally, a control mode x range interaction would
indicate which mode were better depending upon initial range
of the mission. Preliminary data indicated that learning might
be easier in pulse mode but better performance characteristics
are achieved with acceleration control. Asymmetric transfer
effects can also cloud comparison of control modes since the
subjects' asymptotic performance may not be accurately
reflected by the experimental data.
METHOD
Nine commercial airline pilots served as paid test subjects in
this study. Pilots were used because of the expectation that the
manual control, attention, discipline, and intelligence skills
typically associated with flying would enable them to be
superior subjects. In purely subjective terms, however, they
performed no better than any other previous group of
simulated spacecraft pilots. For example, neither learning nor
performance was consistently better than previous groups of
subjects.
The study was performed in the Space Station Proximity
Operations Simulator at NASA Ames Research Center. This
facility simulated a proximity operations control room on a
space station. A PDP 11/60 computer in conjunction with an
Evans and Sutherland PS II picture system drove three
windows. These windows displayed a simulated view out the
-V-bar (negative velocity vector) of a space station in a 270
nautical mile circular orbit around the Earth. An accurate star
field was visible with representatives down to the fifth
magnitude.
A three-degree-of-freedom displacement hand controller was
used to command thruster firings on an orbital maneuvering
vehicle (OMV) remotely. Buttons on the hand controller were
used to control the thruster characteristics for each coordinate
axis independently. Thruster values were toggled among 1.0,
0.1, and 0.01 m/s. The subjects used a joystick-mounted
wigger to begin each trial.
A head-up display (HUD) containing flight data was
superimposed on the center window. Mission duration,
velocity increment, 3-axis range and rate, slant range and rate,
and thruster values were presented to the subjects. 1820
Test subjects performed simulated docking maneuvers of an
OMV to a space station from three different ranges on the -V-
bar. Each subject used both control modes in blocks of 18
consisting of 3 ranges (50, 100, and 150 m) x 6 repetitions in
a latin squares configuration. Five subjects began with
acceleration control and 4 began with pulse control. A test
session consisted of two blocks with each control mode. The
blocks were arranged in an APPA or PAAP order. This
yielded a total of 72 trials for each subject. Experimentation
required about five hours per subject.
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RESULTS
Five-way mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA) with one
between factor, first mode, and four within factors, mode,
block, range, and trial were performed on the data. All
statistically significant effects at the .05 level for the complete
data set are summarized in the following table. Trial refers to
consecutive presentations of identical experimental treatments.
Mode, range, and block are the same for a group of six trials.
Block distinguishes between both groups of 18 consecutive
trials with the same control mode. The blocks were designated
first half and second half.
Table I: Significant effects from ANOVA.
Dep. Var.
Mission
Duration
Velocity
increment
X Velocity
increment
Y Velocity
increment
Z Velocity
increment
X Rate
Significant Factor(s) F p
Mode 12.544 .0094
Range 24.156 .0001
Trial 4.143 .0046
Mode * Block * 1st 5.835 .0464
Mode 6.431 .0389
Range 34.57 .0001
Block * range 5.792 .0147
Mode * bl* r* tr* 1st 2.100 .0357
Block 7.118 .0321
Range 31.344 .0001
Trial 2.653 .0390
Block x range 5.864 .0141
First Mode 31.523 .0008
Range 6.861 .0084
Range * First Mode 6.721 .0090
Mode * Range * Trial 2.308 .0208
Mode * r * tr * 1st 2.287 .0219
Mode * bl * r * Trial 1.984 .0481
Mode* bl* r* t* 1st 2.018 .0441
Range 4.142 .0429
Trial 2.759 .0334
Control mode produced statistically significant, but opposite,
effects on mission duration and Av. Mission duration was
lower with pulse mode while Av was lower with acceleration
mode. Subjects used more fuel to travel faster with pulse
mode than with acceleration mode. As in more mundane,
Earthbound, linear environments, greater velocities, leading to
reduced mission durations, are paid for with increased fuel
consumption. Although the subjects were trained to criterion,
further training could most likely be used to reduce mission
duration and/or fuel consumption levels. These results give
some indication of what the underlying tendencies are before
extensive training.
Mission duration, velocity increment, X velocity increment, Y
velocity increment, and Z velocity increment all increased with
range. Subjects commanded the OMV to "fly" at faster rates
from further distances. These higher average velocities were
paid for by increased fuel consumption.
Z velocity increment, the cumulative total of thrusts used to
correct for orbital mechanics effects, increased with initial
range. This increase was due to the increase in mission
duration with range. More fuel was required to compensate
for the orbital mechanics effects when more time was given for
them to operate.
The most unusual range effect was the one reflected in Y Av.
The y-axis was the out-of-plane component. Since motion
along this axis is uncoupled from motion along the other two
axes, an object with zero y displacement with respect to a
target needs no attention. Although the trials in this study
were initialized so that no thrusts along the y-axis were
required, accidental commands were made from which
recoveries had to be made to achieve a successful docking.
Most likely, the longer mission durations associated with the
greater initial ranges provided the subjects with more time in
which to cause a y disturbance.
Although the subjects practiced to criterion before
experimentation, a practice effect in which subjects improve
with experience was still evidenced in the data. Mission
duration decreased with trial in a typical learning curve format.
Surprisingly, X velocity increment increased with experience.
This effect was most likely due to subjects becoming more
comfortable with the simulated docking maneuver and
consequently using more fuel to travel faster.
The X velocity increment data demonstrated a block effect
also. Fuel consumption along the x-axis was less in the
beginning of testing than in the end. Values from the first
eighteen trials with a mode were less than those from the
second half with means (SDs) of 7.7 (4.9), and 8.9 (6.1) m/s
for the first half and second half respectively. This effect was
similar to the trial effect with fuel consumption and velocity
increasing with experience. It shows the trend following ex-
perience not only within blocks as with the trial effect but also
between blocks as mentioned here.
Three 2-way interactions, two 3-way interactions, two 4-way
interactions, and two 5-way interactions also resulted from the
data analysis. Higher order effects are typically difficult to
decipher. Of particular interest are the ones containing a mode
or first mode term.
The mode x block x first mode interaction for the mission
duration data appears in Figure 1. It shows that the main
effect relationship between the modes, namely, the mean for
mission duration in pulse mode is less than the acceleration
mean only holds for the first half of the data. In the second
half of the data, the pulse data for subjects who began in
acceleration mode has the same mean as the data from those
subjects who began in pulse mode.
The error bars indicate that the data for blocks 2 and 3 for both
sets of subjects are not distinct. Essentially, mission duration
values for the middle two blocks are the same for both modes.
There is also no statistically significant distinction between the
data from blocks 1 and 4 in the PAAP group. However, the
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DISCUSSION
mission duration mean for block 4 is lower than that for block
1 in the APPA group. (See Figure 1.)
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Figure 1: Mission duration 3-way interaction illustrating
asymmetrical transfer.
No improvement in mission duration was found for the
subjects who began with pulse mode while the data from the
acceleration first group display learning. These data support
the experimental hypothesis that experience in pulse mode
helps performance in acceleration mode. Asymmetrical
transfer was found in that the mode transitions could not be
predicted solely from the main effect. Both acceleration means
in the PAAP group were lower than both acceleration means
for the APPA group. The last pulse mission duration means
for both subject groups were equal (i.e., block 3 in the APPA
group and block 4 in the PAAP group).
Analysis of the transitions between consecutive blocks also
yielded interesting results. Both PA transitions were of the
same positive slope. While this is illustrative of the main
effect, (that is, pulse mission duration lower than acceleration
mission duration), only one of the AP transitions was
significantly downward. The single PP transition was
downward, again indicating a learning benefit from a previous
experience with pulse. Conversely, the single AA transition
was unchanged.
An ANOVA was performed on the data collapsed across block
and trial to determine which combinations of independent
variables were more likely to cause an unsuccessful mission.
No statistically significant effects were uncovered. Neither
mode was found to be inherently safer than the other. No
combination of range and mode was more conducive to errors
than any other.
The finding that fuel consumption levels, measured as velocity
increment or Av, were lower in acceleration mode than in pulse
mode corroborates the results from the preliminary
experimentation. Pulse mode is not inherently more fuel
conservative than acceleration mode as one might presume
from studying the appropriate NASA manuals, l, 2 This
indicates that fuel can be used more efficiently in acceleration
mode than pulse mode in a docking operation. This is
probably due to the greater dynamic range with acceleration
control allowing for greater flexibility and fine tuning
capability.
The asymmetrical transfer discovered here is important for
researchers investigating the impact of control modes on
spacecraft docking operations. This result should be regarded
as a forewarning that investigators should be careful when
designing experiments and formulating conclusions. The
asymmetry illustrates an inconsistent main effect for which one
must account before attributing a result to a control mode. In
comparing different control modes, experimenters should be
sure to provide sufficient intervening practice to prevent the
effects of asymmetrical transfer from contaminating the
experimental results.
The data from this study demonstrated that dockings could be
performed faster, albeit at the expense of greater amounts of
fuel, in pulse mode than in acceleration mode. While the
absolute values of time and fuel were specific to the thruster
values that were used, this relationship should be preserved
with different thrusters. A whole assortment of studies could
be performed to examine the effect that thrusters with different
magnitudes from the ones simulated here have on the data. An
interaction between thruster size and range might also be
revealed. What is clear, however, is that pulse mode is not
definitively more fuel efficient than acceleration mode in all
situations. Probably the most necessary conclusion to be
made at this point is the requirement of further human factors
and manual control experimentation before flight protocols are
generalized for all vehicles in all situations.
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